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Abstract Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present
the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that
a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-
referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct
beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s
belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and (4) conditionally
independent beliefs (CIB), stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose
their strategies independently. We show that, if a player satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB,
and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, then he will choose
a Nash strategy (that is, a strategy that is optimal in some Nash equilibrium). We thus
provide a sufficient collection of one-person conditions for Nash strategy choice. We
also show that none of these seven conditions can be dropped.
Keywords Nash equilibrium · Epistemic game theory
1 Introduction
Since its introduction by Nash (1951), the concept of Nash equilibrium has played an
essential role in game theory and its various applications. It is therefore natural to look
for reasonable conditions under which players may be expected to choose according
to Nash equilibrium. Such conditions have been provided in many different settings.
In learning theory one assumes that players play the game repeatedly, and one can find
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reasonable classes of learning rules that eventually lead players to choose according to
some Nash equilibrium. Similarly, evolutionary game theory studies classes of repli-
cator dynamics in the repeated game that converge to (special types of) Nash equilibria
in the long run. If the game is to be played only once, one could think of a situation
in which a mediator publicly announces the mixed strategy profile to the players, and
recommends each player to play his strategy in this profile. Then, players may only
be expected to follow their recommendation if the mixed strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium. One can also formulate sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in a
static setting without mediators. See, for instance, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987),
Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) and Asheim (2006). A key condition in each of
these models is that a player knows, or has a correct belief about, his opponents’ beliefs
about the other players’ strategy choices.
A common feature of each of the models above is that it requires, either explicitly
or implicitly, some sort of communication between players. In the learning models and
evolutionary models players communicate by the actions they choose in the repeated
game. It is this type of communication that allows them to converge to a Nash equi-
librium in the long run. In the static models where players are assumed to have correct
beliefs about the other players’ beliefs, there seems to be a need for ex-ante commu-
nication between players in which they report their beliefs to others. Otherwise, there
is no reason to expect that players should be right about the opponents’ beliefs, even
if common belief in rationality is imposed.
In this paper, we completely focus on static settings in which there is no com-
munication between players. In such a setting, a player can base his strategy choice
solely upon his own beliefs about the opponents’ choices and his own beliefs about the
opponents’ beliefs, since before making his decision he receives no information about
what opponents do or believe. It thus makes sense to analyze the game from a single
player’s perspective, and this is exactly what we will do. More precisely, we focus on
one player, say player i , in the game, and impose conditions solely on the beliefs that
player i has about the other players’ strategy choices and the other players’ beliefs.
We do not impose any conditions on the beliefs and choices of players other than i . We
thus allow for the event that player i believes that some opponent believes or chooses
in a certain way, whereas in fact this opponent believes or chooses differently.
A question that arises within this one-person approach is: “How should we interpret
Nash equilibrium?” Usually, Nash equilibrium is either interpreted as an equilibrium
in choices or as an equilibrium in beliefs. The first interpretation states that a player’s
choice should be optimal given the other players’ choices, whereas the second inter-
pretation states that player i’s belief about player j’s choice should only assign positive
probability to choices that are optimal for player j , given j’s belief about the other
players’ choices. Both interpretations, however, require that we simultaneously impose
conditions on the choices or beliefs of all players, not just player i . So, how can we
make sense of Nash equilibrium in a one-person approach?
A possible way is to interpret all the beliefs in a Nash equilibrium as belonging to a
single player. Consider, for instance, a game with two players, say players i and j , and
a Nash equilibrium (µi , µ j ), where µi is a probability distribution over i’s choices,
and µ j is a probability distribution over j’s choices. A possible one-person interpre-
tation is that µ j represents i’s belief about j’s choice, and that µi represents i’s belief
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about j’s belief about i’s choice. That is, the Nash equilibrium (µi , µ j ) is completely
“in the mind of player i ,” as µi and µ j represent beliefs that both belong to him. The
Nash equilibrium, when interpreted in this way, says nothing about player j’s actual
belief about i’s choice. In fact, it may be the case that in this Nash equilibrium, player
i is completely wrong about what j really believes or does.
Once we interpret Nash equilibrium as describing player i’s state of mind, we may
explore its behavioral consequences. So, again in a two player setting, if i’s belief
about j’s choice and i’s belief about j’s belief about i’s choice together constitute a
Nash equilibrium, what can i rationally choose? The answer is almost tautological:
any strategy choice for i that is optimal in some Nash equilibrium (µi , µ j ). We refer
to such strategies as Nash strategies. The logical relation between Nash strategies on
the one hand, and strategies receiving positive probability in some Nash equilibrium
on the other hand is more subtle than it may appear at first. Every strategy that receives
positive probability in some Nash equilibrium is a Nash strategy, but not every Nash
strategy receives positive probability in some Nash equilibrium. Consider, for instance,
the game in Fig. 1. Player 1 is the row player, and player 2 the column player. In this
game, (b, 12 c+ 12 d) is a Nash equilibrium. Since strategy a is optimal against 12 c+ 12 d,
it follows that a is a Nash strategy. However, there is no Nash equilibrium (µ1, µ2) in
which µ1 assigns positive probability to a. At the same time, we should not exclude
the choice a if we require that player 1’s belief about player 2’s choice and player 1’s
belief about player 2’s belief about his own choice constitute a Nash equilibrium. It is
possible, namely, that player 1’s belief about 2’s choice is given by 12 c + 12 d, that he
believes that 2 believes that he will choose b, whereas in fact he will choose a. Then,
player 1’s beliefs above constitute a Nash equilibrium, but he chooses a Nash strategy
that cannot have positive probability in any Nash equilibrium.
The objective of this paper is to identify reasonable conditions on the beliefs of a sin-
gle player which would guarantee that this player eventually chooses a Nash strategy.
We thus offer one-person doxastic conditions for Nash strategies. As an illustration
of our objective, consider the game in Fig. 2, which is taken from Myerson (1991,
Fig. 1 Not every Nash strategy is assigned positive probability in a Nash equilibrium
Fig. 2 Rationalizability versus Nash strategies
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p. 94). Suppose that the game is played only once, and that player 1 and player 2
cannot communicate to each other. We will analyze this game completely from player
1’s perspective. It can be shown that common belief in rationality does not exclude
any of player 1’s strategies, but that strategy b is the only Nash strategy for player 1.
Consider, namely, a scenario in which
1. player 1 believes that player 2 chooses d,
2. player 1 believes that player 2 believes that player 1 chooses c,
3. player 1 believes that player 2 believes that player 1 believes that player 2 chooses
f ,
4. player 1 believes that player 2 believes that player 1 believes that player 2 believes
that player 1 chooses a,
5. player 1 believes that player 2 believes that player 1 believes that player 2 believes
that player 1 believes that player 2 chooses d,
and so on. Then, player 1 respects common belief in rationality, since he believes
that player 2 chooses rationally, believes that player 2 believes that player 1 chooses
rationally, and so on. Since in this scenario it is rational for player 1 to choose a, we
must allow for the strategy a if we only impose common belief in rationality. Since
strategies a and c play similar roles in this game, one can construct a similar scenario
that leads to strategy choice c. Finally, strategy b can be justified by a much simpler
scenario in which
1. player 1 believes that player 2 chooses e,
2. player 1 believes that player 2 believes that player 1 chooses b,
3. player 1 believes that player 2 believes that player 1 believes that player 2 chooses
e,
and so on. Summarizing, every strategy for player 1 can be justified by a belief hier-
archy for player 1 that respects common belief in rationality. More generally, Tan
and Werlang (1988) have shown that the strategies which can be chosen rationally in
two-player games when imposing only common belief in rationality are exactly the
rationalizable strategies in the sense of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984).1
On the other hand, it can be shown that b is the only Nash strategy for player 1.
In order to see this, it is helpful to consider Fig. 3 which depicts the players’ best
response correspondences in this game. The first triangle should be read as follows.
Every point in the triangle represents a probabilistic belief of player 1 about player
2’s strategies. The three areas in this triangle represent the sets of beliefs for which
the strategies a, b and c are optimal, respectively. Similarly for the second triangle.
Consider a Nash equilibrium (µ1, µ2) of the game, where µi is a probability distri-
bution over i’s strategies for i = 1, 2. We show that µ1 must assign probability 1 to
b, and µ2 must assign probability 1 to e. Suppose, contrary to what we want to show,
that µ1 assigns positive probability to a. Then, since (µ1, µ2) is a Nash equilibrium,
a must be optimal for player 1 against µ2. By Fig. 2, µ2 must then assign positive
probability to d, and hence d must be optimal against µ1. By Fig. 2, µ1 must then
1 For more than two players, one needs to impose that beliefs about different opponents be stochastically
independent in order to obtain the equivalence with rationalizability.
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Fig. 3 Best response correspondences for the game in Fig. 2
assign positive probability to c, and hence c must be optimal against µ2. So, both a
and c should be optimal against µ2. However, from the first triangle it is clear that
a and c cannot both be optimal against µ2, and hence we have a contradiction. By
symmetry, one can similarly prove that µ1 cannot assign positive probability to c, and
that µ2 cannot assign positive probability to d or f . Hence, the only strategy that can
rationally be chosen by player 1 in a Nash equilibrium is b, and therefore b is the only
Nash strategy for player 1.
Now, let us compare the scenario above which led to the non-Nash strategy a
with the simpler scenario that led to the Nash strategy b. One fundamental difference
between both scenarios is that the first assumes that player 1 believes that player 2 is
wrong about 1’s belief, whereas the second scenario assumes that player 1 believes
that player 2 is right about 1’s belief. Namely, in the first scenario player 1 believes
that player 2 chooses d, but he believes that player 2 believes that he believes that
player 2 chooses f , and not d.
Even stronger, the choice a can only be justified by scenarios in which player 1
believes that player 2 is wrong about 1’s belief. In order to see this, assume that
strategy a would be optimal for player 1. Then, player 1 must believe with positive
probability that player 2 chooses d. In turn, player 2 can only rationally choose d if
he believes with positive probability that player 1 chooses c. Hence, player 1 must
believe with positive probability that player 2 believes with positive probability that
player 1 chooses c. However, there is no belief for player 1 for which both a and c
are rational, and hence player 1 must believe with positive probability that player 2
believes with positive probability that player 1’s belief is different from his true belief.
Say that a belief hierarchy βi for player i has self-referential beliefs if βi believes
that every opponent j believes that i’s belief hierarchy is βi . For the example in Fig. 2,
we may thus conclude that the difference between Nash strategies and rationaliz-
able non-Nash strategies is that the former can be justified by a self-referential belief
hierarchy, whereas the latter cannot. The question is whether this is true generally.
In Theorem 4.5 we show that this is true for the class of two-player games. More
precisely, we show in Theorem 4.5 that in every two-player game, a player who (1)
believes in the opponent’s rationality (BOR), (2) has self-referential beliefs (SRB),
(3) believes that his opponent BOR, and (4) believes that his opponent has SRB, must
choose a Nash strategy.
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The four conditions above are no longer enough if we turn to more than two players.
Similarly to existing foundations for Nash equilibrium in the literature, we encounter
the following two problems for more than two players: (a) We must guarantee that
player i’s belief about opponent j’s strategy choice should be stochastically indepen-
dent from i’s belief about opponent k’s strategy choice, and (b) we must guarantee
that player i believes that opponents j and k hold the same belief about player l’s
strategy choice. In this paper, we guarantee these events by imposing conditionally
independent beliefs and projective beliefs. Conditionally independent beliefs (CIB) is
taken from Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2006), and says that for any given profile
of belief hierarchies for i’s opponents, player i’s belief about his opponents’ strategy
choices conditional on this profile of belief hierarchies should be uncorrelated. In other
words, any correlation in i’s belief about his opponents’ strategy choices should be
due to correlation in his belief about the opponents’ belief hierarchies. The idea behind
this condition is that players with fixed belief hierarchies are assumed to choose their
strategies independently. Projective beliefs (PB), in turn, states that player i believes
that j’s belief about player k is the same as his own belief about player k. That is,
player i projects his own belief about player k on player j . In Theorem 4.5 we show
that for three players or more, a player who (1) BOR, (2) has SRB, (3) believes that
his opponents BOR, (4) believes that his opponents have SRB, and, in addition, (5)
has CIB, (6) believes that his opponents have PB, and (7) believes that his opponents
have CIB, must choose a Nash strategy. At this stage, one may wonder why we did not
impose that the player himself has PB. The reason is that this property follows from
the assumptions that the player has SRB and believes that every opponent has PB (see
Lemma 4.2).
The outline of this paper is as follows: In Sect. 2 we present our epistemic model.
Section 3 formally introduces the notions of BOR, SRB, PB and CIB. In Sect. 4 we
show that every player who satisfies the conditions (1)–(7) above must choose a Nash
strategy. In Theorem 4.7 we prove the converse of this result, namely that every Nash
strategy can rationally be chosen by a player who satisfies these conditions (1)–(7).
In Sect. 5 we prove that none of these seven conditions can be dropped in Theorem
4.5. In particular, this implies that the seven conditions are logically independent. In
Sect. 6 we discuss the intuitive content of Theorems 4.5 and 4.7, with a special focus
on SRB and PB. In Sect. 7 we compare our conditions with sufficient conditions for
Nash equilibrium as provided in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), Asheim (2006)
and Brandenburger and Dekel (1987).
2 Epistemic model
Let I be a finite set of players. A finite game is a tuple  = (Si , ui )i∈I , where Si
is the finite set of strategies for player i , and ui : × j∈I S j → R is player i’s utility
function. We shall assume throughout that a player believes that the utility functions
are as specified by , that a player believes that all players believe this, and so on. For
every finite set X , let (X) denote the set of probability distributions on X .
Definition 2.1 (Epistemic model) A finite epistemic model for the game  is a tuple
M = (Ti , βi )i∈I
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where, for every player i , Ti is a finite set of types, and βi is a one-to-one function
from Ti to (S−i × T−i ).
Here, S−i is a short way to write × j =i S j , and similarly for T−i . The interpretation
of βi is that for every type ti ∈ Ti , the image βi (ti ) denotes ti ’s probabilistic belief
about the opponents’ strategy choices and types. For every event E ⊆ S−i × T−i
for player i and every number p ∈ [0, 1], we say that type ti believes the event E
with probability p if βi (ti )(E) = p. We say that ti believes E if βi (ti )(E) = 1. For
instance, we say that ti believes that player j has type t j if ti assigns probability 1 to
the set of strategy-type profiles in S−i × T−i where player j’s type is t j .
3 Restrictions on beliefs
In this section we discuss four conditions that one may impose on a player’s beliefs:
belief in the opponents’ rationality, self-referential beliefs, projective beliefs and con-
ditionally independent beliefs. We first need some additional terminology. For every
type ti and strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i , we denote by βi (ti )(s−i ) the probability that the
belief βi (ti ) assigns to the set {s−i } × T−i . For every strategy si ∈ Si , we denote by
ui (si , ti ) :=
∑
s−i ∈S−i
βi (ti )(s−i )ui (si , s−i )
the expected utility for type ti of choosing strategy si . We say that strategy si is rational
for type ti if ui (si , ti ) ≥ ui (s′i , ti ) for every s′i ∈ Si .
Definition 3.1 (Belief in the opponents’ rationality) Type ti is said to believe in the
opponents’ rationality if for every opponent j , and every strategy-type pair (s j , t j ) ∈
S j × Tj to which ti assigns positive probability, the strategy s j is rational for type t j .
Definition 3.2 (Self-referential beliefs) Type ti is said to have self-referential beliefs
if for every p ∈ [0, 1] and every event E ⊆ S−i × T−i which ti believes with prob-
ability p, type ti believes that all opponents believe that player i believes E with
probability p.
Hence, a player with self-referential beliefs thinks that his opponents hold correct
beliefs about his own beliefs. Now, let j be an opponent of i , and let E j ⊆ S j × Tj
be an event about player j . We say that ti believes E j with probability p if ti assigns
probability p to the event
E j × (×k =i, j (Sk × Tk)).
Definition 3.3 (Projective beliefs) Type ti is said to have projective beliefs if for every
pair of opponents j, k and every event Ek ⊆ Sk × Tk about player k: if ti believes Ek
with probability p, then ti believes that j believes Ek with probability p.
Intuitively, a player with projective beliefs projects his belief about an opponent on
his other opponents. Of course, this condition only imposes restrictions if there are
at least three players. Our last condition, conditionally independent beliefs, is taken
from Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2006). It states that for every given profile t−i of
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opponents’ types which is deemed possible by type ti , his belief about the opponents’
strategies conditional on t−i should be uncorrelated. In other words, any correlation
in ti ’s belief about the opponents’ strategy choices should come from correlation in
his belief about the opponents’ types. The idea behind this condition is that types are
assumed to choose their strategies independently since pre-play communication is not
allowed. However, player i’s belief about j’s choice may still be dependent on his
belief about k’s choice if his belief about j’s type is dependent on his belief about k’s
type. To formalize this condition, we need some terminology. Let t−i be a profile of
opponents’ types to which ti assigns positive probability, and let s−i be a profile of
opponents’ strategies. By
βi (ti )(s−i |t−i ) := βi (ti )(s−i , t−i )
βi (ti )(t−i )
we denote the probability that ti assigns to the strategy profile s−i , conditional on the
event that the opponents’ types are given by t−i . Here, βi (ti )(t−i ) denotes the proba-
bility that ti assigns to the event that the opponents’ types are t−i . Similarly, for every
opponent j , every type t j to which ti assigns positive probability, and every strategy
s j ∈ S j , we denote by
βi (ti )(s j |t j ) := βi (ti )(s j , t j )
βi (ti )(t j )
the probability that ti assigns to strategy choice s j , conditional on the event that j’s
type is t j . Here, βi (ti )(s j , t j ) denotes the probability that ti assigns to the event that j
chooses s j and has type t j , whereas βi (ti )(t j ) is the probability that ti assigns to the
event that j has type t j .
Definition 3.4 (Conditionally independent beliefs) Type ti is said to have condition-
ally independent beliefs if for every t−i ∈ T−i with βi (ti )(t−i ) > 0, and every s−i ∈
S−i :
βi (ti )(s−i |t−i ) =
∏
j =i βi (ti )(s j |t j ).
In fact, this condition combines the restrictions of conditional independence and
sufficiency in Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2006). In their model, sufficiency
states that player i’s belief about player j’s strategy choice should be independent
of his belief about some other opponent’s type. Obviously, our notion of condition-
ally independent beliefs satisfies this additional requirement. It should be clear that
conditionally independent beliefs only imposes restrictions if there are at least three
players.
As an abbreviation, we denote by BOR, SRB, PB and CIB the events that types
believe in the opponents’ rationality, have self-referential beliefs, have projective be-
liefs, and have conditionally independent beliefs, respectively. We say that type ti
believes that every opponent satisfies BOR if βi (ti ) only assigns positive probability
to opponents’ types that satisfy BOR. Similarly, we define the events that ti believes
that every opponent satisfies SRB, PB and CIB.
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4 Relation with Nash strategies
In this section we show that every type which satisfies BOR, SRB, and CIB, believes
that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, and chooses rationally, must
choose a Nash strategy. A profile (µi )i∈I of probability distributions µi ∈ (Si ) is
called a Nash equilibrium for the game  if, for every player i , µi (si ) > 0 only if
ui (si , µ−i ) ≥ ui (s′i , µ−i ) for every s′i ∈ Si . Here,





µ j (s j )ui (si , s−i )
denotes the expected utility for player i of choosing si if his belief about the opponents’
strategies is given by µ−i .
We call a strategy si a Nash strategy for  if there is a Nash equilibrium (µi )i∈I for
 such that ui (si , µ−i ) ≥ ui (s′i , µ−i ) for every s′i ∈ Si . Since this definition is non-
standard, it requires some further explanation. In many models, a Nash equilibrium
(µi )i∈I is interpreted as an equilibrium in beliefs, and µ−i represents player i’s belief
about his opponents’ strategy choices. This is also the viewpoint I take in this paper.
With this interpretation in mind, one can ask the following natural question: What are
the behavioral consequences of requiring that player i’s belief about the opponents’
strategy choices is part of a Nash equilibrium in beliefs? In other words, which strat-
egies can player i rationally choose if his belief µ−i about the opponents’ strategies
is part of a Nash equilibrium in beliefs? The answer must then be: any Nash strategy
as defined above. Hence, the definition of a Nash strategy formalizes the behavioral
consequences of assuming that player i’s beliefs about the opponents is part of a Nash
equilibrium in beliefs. Recall from the introduction that every strategy that is assigned
positive probability in some Nash equilibrium in beliefs is also a Nash strategy, but
the converse is not true.
Before we prove our theorem on the relation with Nash strategies, we first derive
some implications of SRB, PB, CIB, and belief in these events. In each of these lemmas,
we assume that M = (Ti , βi )i∈I is a finite epistemic model for a finite game .
Lemma 4.1 Let ti ∈ Ti be a type with SRB. Then, ti believes that every opponent
believes that i’s type is ti .
Proof Choose an arbitrary event E ⊆ S−i × T−i for player i , and assume that ti
believes E with probability p. By SRB, ti believes that every opponent believes that
i believes E with probability p. Since this holds for every E , and since the function
βi : Ti → (S−i × T−i ) in the epistemic model is one-to-one, ti believes that every
opponent believes that i’s type is ti . unionsq
Lemma 4.2 Let ti ∈ Ti be a type with SRB which believes that every opponent has
PB. Then, ti has PB.
Proof Suppose that j and k are two different opponents of player i . Let Ek ⊆ Sk × Tk
be an event which ti believes with probability p, and let t j ∈ Tj be a type to which ti
assigns positive probability. We show that t j believes Ek with probability p as well.
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Since ti has SRB, we know from Lemma 4.1 that t j believes that i’s type is ti . Since ti
believes that j has PB, it must be the case that t j has PB, and hence t j ’s belief about
player k must be the same as ti ’s belief about player k. Consequently, t j must believe
Ek with probability p. We may thus conclude that ti has PB. unionsq
Lemma 4.3 Let ti be a type with SRB which believes that every opponent has PB and
SRB. Then, there are opponents’ types tk ∈ Tk, k ∈ I\{i}, such that (1) ti believes for
every j = i that j’s type is t j , (2) for every j = i , type t j believes that i’s type is ti ,
and (3) for every j, k = i , type t j believes that k’s type is tk .
Proof Suppose that j = i , and that ti assigns positive probability to type t j ∈ Tj . By
Lemma 4.1 we know that ti believes that j believes that i’s type is ti . Hence, t j must
believe that i’s type is ti . Since ti believes that j has SRB, type t j must have SRB. By
applying Lemma 4.1 to t j , we may conclude that t j believes that i believes that j’s
type is t j . Since we have seen that t j believes that i’s type is ti , it follows that ti must
believe that j’s type is t j . Hence, we have shown properties (1) and (2). It remains
to show (3). By Lemma 4.2 we know that ti has PB. Suppose that j, k = i . Since ti
believes that k’s type is tk , and since ti has PB, it follows that ti believes that j believes
that k’s type is tk . Since ti believes that j’s type is t j , type t j believes that k’s type is
tk . This completes the proof. unionsq
Lemma 4.4 Let ti ∈ Ti be a type that has SRB and CIB, and believes that every oppo-
nent has SRB, PB and CIB. Then, there are probability distributions µk ∈ (Sk),
k ∈ I , such that (1) ti believes that every opponents’ strategy profile (s j ) j =i is chosen
with probability
∏
j =i µ j (s j ), (2) for every j = i , type ti believes that j believes that
every opponents’ strategy profile (sk)k = j is chosen with probability
∏
k = j µk(sk), and
(3) for every j = i , type ti believes that j believes that i believes that every opponents’
strategy profile (s j ) j =i is chosen with probability
∏
j =i µ j (s j ).
Proof By Lemma 4.3, there are opponents’ types tk ∈ Tk, k ∈ I\{i}, such that (1)
ti believes for every j = i that j’s type is t j , (2) for every j = i , type t j believes
that i’s type is ti , and (3) for every j, k = i , type t j believes that k’s type is tk . Let
t−i := (t j ) j =i . Since ti has CIB, it holds that
βi (ti )(s−i |t−i ) =
∏
j =i βi (ti )(s j |t j ) (4.1)
for every s−i ∈ S−i . Now, define µ j (s j ) := βi (ti )(s j |t j ) for every j = i and every
s j ∈ S j . Then, by (4.1) and the fact that ti believes that every opponent j has type t j ,
type ti believes that every opponents’ strategy profile s−i is chosen with probability∏
j =i µ j (s j ). We have thus shown property (1) of this lemma.
Now, choose some fixed opponent j = i . Since ti believes that j has CIB, and ti
believes that j’s type is t j , type t j has CIB. Hence,
β j (t j )(s− j |t− j ) =
∏
k = j β j (t j )(sk |tk) (4.2)
for every opponents’ strategy profile s− j . Choose some arbitrary player k /∈ {i, j}.
Since, by Lemma 4.2, ti has PB and believes that j’s type is t j , type ti ’s belief
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about k’s strategy choice must be equal to t j ’s belief about k’s strategy choice, and
hence β j (t j )(sk |tk) = βi (ti )(sk |tk) = µk(sk) for every sk ∈ Sk . Define µi (si ) :=
β j (t j )(si |ti ) for every si ∈ Si . Together with (4.2), we may then conclude that
t j believes that every opponents’ strategy profile s− j is chosen with probability∏
k = j µk(sk). So, ti believes that j believes that every opponents’ strategy profile
s− j is chosen with probability
∏
k = j µk(sk).
Finally, choose some arbitrary player k /∈ {i, j}. Since ti believes that k has CIB,
and believes that k’s type is tk , type tk must have CIB. Hence,
βk(tk)(s−k |t−k) =
∏
l =k βk(tk)(sl |tl) (4.3)
for every s−k ∈ S−k . Let l /∈ {i, k}. By Lemma 4.2 we know that ti has PB. Since ti has
PB, and believes that k’s type is tk , type ti ’s belief about l’s strategy choice must be
equal to k’s belief about l’s strategy choice, and hence βk(tk)(sl |tl) = βi (ti )(sl |tl) =
µl(sl) for every sl ∈ Sl . Since ti believes that j has PB, and believes that j has type
t j , type t j must have PB. Hence, t j ’s belief about i’s strategy choice must be equal to
k’s belief about i’s strategy choice, which implies that βk(tk)(si |ti ) = β j (t j )(si |ti ) =
µi (si ). Combined with (4.3) we obtain that tk believes that every opponents’ strat-
egy profile s−k is chosen with probability
∏
l =k µl(sl). So, ti believes that every
k = j believes that every opponents’ strategy profile s−k is chosen with probability∏
l =k µl(sl). Hence, we have shown property (2).
Since we already know from Lemma 4.1 that ti believes that every opponent j
believes that i’s type is ti , property (3) follows immediately. This completes the
proof. unionsq
We are now ready to prove our main theorem.
Theorem 4.5 Let M = (Ti , βi )i∈I be a finite epistemic model for a finite game . Let
ti ∈ Ti be a type that satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent
satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB. Then, every strategy that is rational for ti is a Nash
strategy for .
Proof Let ti be a type that satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every oppo-
nent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB. Let µk ∈ (Sk), k ∈ I , be the probability
distributions obtained from Lemma 4.4. We show that (µk)k∈I is a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose first that j = i and that µ j (s j ) > 0 for some s j ∈ S j . Since ti believes
in j’s rationality, and, by (2), believes that j’s belief about the opponents’ strategy
choices is given by µ− j = (µk)k = j , it follows that s j must be optimal against µ− j .
Finally, let µi (si ) > 0 for some si ∈ Si . Choose some arbitrary opponent j . Since,
by (2), ti ’s belief about j’s belief about the opponents’ strategy choice is given by
µ− j , type ti believes that j believes that i chooses si with positive probability. Since
ti believes that j believes in i’s rationality, and since, by (3), ti ’s belief about j’s belief
about i’s belief about the opponents’ strategy choices is given by µ−i , it follows that
si must be optimal against µ−i . Hence, (µ j ) j∈I is a Nash equilibrium.
Now, choose some strategy si that is rational for ti . Since, by (1), ti ’s belief about
the opponents’ strategy choices is µ−i , strategy si must be optimal against µ−i . As
(µi , µ−i ) is a Nash equilibrium, si is a Nash strategy. This completes the proof. unionsq
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Theorem 4.5 thus provides sufficient doxastic conditions for choosing Nash strat-
egies. The question remains whether the conditions in this theorem also lead, in some
sense, to Nash equilibrium in beliefs. The answer is “yes.” Consider, namely, a type
ti that satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR,
SRB, PB and CIB. In the proof of Theorem 4.5, we have shown that there exist prob-
ability distributions µk ∈ (Sk), k ∈ I , such that (1) for j = i , µ j is ti ’s belief about
j’s strategy choice, and also ti ’s belief about any other player’s belief about player j’s
strategy choice, and (2) µi is ti ’s belief about any other player’s belief about his own
strategy choice. Moreover, we have shown in the proof that the profile (µk)k∈I is a
Nash equilibrium in beliefs. We thus obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.6 Let M = (Ti , βi )i∈I be a finite epistemic model for a finite game .
Let ti ∈ Ti be a type that satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent
satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB. For every player j = i , let µ j ∈ (S j ) be ti ’s belief
about j’s strategy choice, and let µi be ti ’s belief about any other player’s belief about
his own strategy choice. Then, (µ j ) j∈I is a Nash equilibrium in beliefs.
Our last result shows that every Nash strategy can be chosen rationally by a type that
satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that his opponents satisfy BOR, SRB, PB
and CIB. In particular, the combination of these seven events is shown to be possible.
Theorem 4.7 Let  be a finite game, and let si be a Nash strategy for player i in .
Then, there exists a finite epistemic model M = (Ti , βi )i∈I for , and a type ti ∈ Ti ,
such that si is rational for ti , type ti satisfies BOR, SRB, and CIB, and believes that
every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB.
Proof Let si be a Nash strategy for . Then, there is a Nash equilibrium (µ j ) j∈I
for  such that si is optimal for i against µ−i . We define the epistemic model M =
(Ti , βi )i∈I as follows: Define Tj := {tˆ j } for every player j , and let β j (tˆ j ) be the
probability distribution on S− j × T− j given by
β j (tˆ j )(s− j , t− j ) :=
{∏
k = j µk(sk), if t− j = tˆ− j
0, otherwise.
We show that for every player j , the type tˆ j satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB. Since
tˆi believes, for every opponent j , that j’s type is tˆ j , it would follow that tˆi believes
that every opponent satisfies these four conditions as well.
BOR: Let k be an opponent for j , and let sk be a strategy for k withβ j (tˆ j )(sk, tˆk) > 0.
Then, µk(sk) > 0. Since (µ j ) j∈I is a Nash equilibrium, sk is optimal for k against
µ−k , and hence sk is rational for tˆk . Therefore, tˆ j satisfies BOR.
SRB: By construction, tˆ j believes that every opponent k has type tˆk . Moreover,
every such type tˆk believes that j’s type is tˆ j . Hence, tˆ j believes that every opponent
believes that j’s type is tˆ j . Now, suppose that tˆ j believes an event E with probability p.
Then, since tˆ j believes that every opponent believes that j’s type is tˆ j , type tˆ j believes
that every opponent believes that j believes E with probability p. Consequently, tˆ j
satisfies SRB.
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PB: Let k, l be two different opponents for j , let Ek ⊆ Sk × Tk , and suppose that
tˆ j believes Ek with probability p. By construction, tˆ j believes that l’s type is tˆl , and
tˆl ’s belief about player k is the same as tˆ j ’s belief about player k. Hence, tˆ j believes
that l believes Ek with probability p. We may thus conclude that tˆ j satisfies PB.
CIB: It follows immediately from the construction of the epistemic model that tˆ j
satisfies CIB.
Hence, we may conclude that every tˆ j satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB. This
implies that tˆi satisfies these four conditions, and believes that every opponent satis-
fies these four conditions too. Recall that the Nash equilibrium (µ j ) j∈I was chosen
such that si is optimal for i against µ−i . Since µ−i is tˆi ’s belief about the opponents’
strategy choices, si is rational for tˆi . This completes the proof. unionsq
5 No conditions can be dropped
In Theorem 4.5 we have shown that the conditions BOR, SRB, CIB, and belief in
BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, lead to Nash strategy choices. So, in total we have seven
conditions that we impose on a player’s beliefs. In this section we prove that this result
no longer holds if we drop one of these seven conditions. In particular, we show that
these seven conditions are logically independent.
Dropping BOR: Consider the two-player game in Fig. 4, where player 1 chooses the
rows and player 2 the columns. Construct an epistemic model M such that T1 = {t1},
T2 = {t2}, β1(t1) assigns probability 1 to (d, t2), and β2(t2) assigns probability 1 to
(a, t1). Then, t1 does not BOR, since d is not optimal for t2. On the other hand, t1
believes that player 2 BOR, since a is optimal for t1. Type t1 has SRB since t1 believes
that player 2 believes that his type is t1. Similarly, t2 has SRB, and hence t1 believes
in SRB. Clearly, t1 has CIB, and believes that player 2 has PB and CIB, since these
conditions are automatically satisfied for two players. Hence, t1 does not BOR, but
satisfies the other six conditions. Strategy a is rational for t1, but a is not a Nash
strategy.
Dropping belief in BOR: Consider again the two-player game in Fig. 4. Construct
an epistemic model M such that T1 = {t1}, T2 = {t2}, β1(t1) assigns probability 1 to
(d, t2), and β2(t2) assigns probability 1 to (c, t1). Then, t1 does not believe in BOR,
since c is not optimal for t1. However, t1 satisfies the other six conditions. Strategy a
is optimal for t1, but a is not a Nash strategy.
Fig. 4 BOR and belief in BOR cannot be dropped
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Fig. 5 SRB and belief in SRB cannot be dropped
Fig. 6 Belief in PB cannot be dropped
Dropping SRB: Consider the two-player game in Fig. 5. It can be shown that (c, f )
is the only Nash equilibrium, and hence c is the only Nash strategy for player 1.
Construct an epistemic model M such that T1 = {ta1 , tb1 }, T2 = {t2}, β1(ta1 ) assigns
probability 1 to (d, t2), β1(tb1 ) assigns probability 1 to (e, t2), and β2(t2) assigns prob-
ability 1/2 to (a, ta1 ) and probability 1/2 to (b, t
b
1 ). Then, t
a
1 does not have SRB, since
ta1 believes that player 2 believes with probability 1/2 that his type is t
b
1 and not t
a
1 .
However, ta1 satisfies the other six conditions. Strategy a is optimal for t
a
1 , but a is not
a Nash strategy.
Dropping belief in SRB: Consider again the two-player game in Fig. 5. Recall that
(c, f ) is the only Nash equilibrium, and hence f is the only Nash strategy for player
2. Construct an epistemic model M such that T1 = {ta1 , tb1 }, T2 = {t2}, β1(ta1 ) assigns
probability 1 to (d, t2), β1(tb1 ) assigns probability 1 to (e, t2), and β2(t2) assigns prob-
ability 1/2 to (a, ta1 ) and probability 1/2 to (b, t
b
1 ). Then, t2 does not believe in SRB,
since ta1 and t
b
1 do not have SRB. However, t2 satisfies the other six conditions. Strategy
d is optimal for t2, but d is not a Nash strategy.
Dropping belief in PB: Consider the three-player game in Fig. 6. Here, player
1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix
(g, h or i). Construct an epistemic model M such that T1 = {t1}, T2 = {t2}, T3 =
{t3}, β1(t1) assigns probability 1 to ((e, t2), (g, t3)), β2(t2) assigns probability 1 to
((a, t1), (h, t3)), and β3(t3) assigns probability 1 to ((a, t1), (e, t2)). Type t3 does not
believe in PB, since t1 does not have PB. In order to see this, note that t1 believes that
player 3 chooses g, whereas t1 believes that player 2 believes that player 3 chooses h.
It can easily be verified that t3 satisfies the other six conditions.
Strategy g is rational for type t3. However, we will show that g is not a Nash strat-
egy. Suppose, contrary to what we want to show, that g would be a Nash strategy.
Then, there would be a Nash equilibrium (µ1, µ2, µ3) such that g would be opti-
mal against (µ1, µ2). Strategy g can only be optimal against (µ1, µ2) if µ1(a) > 0
and µ2(e) > 0. Since (µ1, µ2, µ3) is a Nash equilibrium, this implies that a is opti-
mal against (µ2, µ3) and e is optimal against (µ1, µ3)˙. This, in turn, implies that
µ3(g) ≥ 2/3 and µ3(h) ≥ 2/3, which is clearly impossible. Hence, g is not a Nash
strategy.
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Fig. 7 CIB and belief in CIB cannot be dropped
Dropping CIB: Consider the three-player game in Fig. 7. Construct an epistemic
model M such that T1 = {t1}, T2 = {t2}, T3 = {t3}, β1(t1) assigns probability 1/2 to
((d, t2), (h, t3)) and probability 1/2 to ((e, t2), (h, t3)), β2(t2) assigns probability 1/2
to ((a, t1), (h, t3)) and probability 1/2 to ((b, t1), (h, t3)), and β3(t3) assigns proba-
bility 1/2 to ((a, t1), (d, t2)) and probability 1/2 to ((b, t1), (e, t2)). Then, t3 does not
have CIB. It may be verified that t3 satisfies the other six conditions.
Strategy h is rational for t3. However, we will show that h is not a Nash strategy.
Assume, namely, that (µ1, µ2, µ3) would be a Nash equilibrium such that h would
be optimal against (µ1, µ2). If µ1(a) ≤ 1/2, it can be shown that u3(h, µ1, µ2) <
u3(i, µ1, µ2). If µ1(a) ≥ 1/2, it can be shown that u3(h, µ1, µ2) < u3(g, µ1, µ2).
Hence, h can never be optimal against (µ1, µ2), and therefore h is not a Nash strategy.
Dropping belief in CIB: Consider again the three-player game in Fig. 7. Construct
an epistemic model M such that T1 = {t1}, T2 = {t2}, T3 = {t3}, β1(t1) assigns prob-
ability 1/2 to ((d, t2), (h, t3)) and probability 1/2 to ((e, t2), (h, t3)), β2(t2) assigns
probability 1/2 to ((a, t1), (h, t3)) and probability 1/2 to ((b, t1), (h, t3)), and β3(t3)
assigns probability 1/2 to ((a, t1), (d, t2)) and probability 1/2 to ((b, t1), (e, t2)).
Then, t1 does not believe in CIB, since t3 does not have CIB. It may be verified that t1
satisfies the other six conditions.
Strategy a is rational for t1. However, we will show that a is not a Nash strategy.
We have seen above that h is not a Nash strategy. In particular, there is no Nash equi-
librium that assigns positive probability to h. But then, a cannot be optimal in a Nash
equilibrium, and hence a is not a Nash strategy.
6 Discussion of main result
Our main result comes in two parts: In Theorem 4.5 we first show that, if a player
satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB,
PB and CIB, then this player will eventually choose a Nash strategy. We next prove in
Theorem 4.7 that every Nash strategy for player i can be supported by a player i belief
hierarchy that satisfies these seven conditions. By combining these two results, we
may thus view the seven conditions above as a one-person doxastic characterization
of Nash strategies.
6.1 Discussion of SRB and PB
Since SRB and PB are new, and play a crucial role in the doxastic characterization of
Nash strategies, we will discuss these two conditions in some more depth here. Both
SRB and PB reflect the event that player i uses his own beliefs as a “focal point” for
what he believes that others believe. In SRB, namely, player i uses his own belief
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about himself (assuming that he has a correct belief about himself) as a focal point
for what he believes that others believe about himself, whereas in PB player i uses his
own belief about opponent j as a focal point for what he believes that others believe
about opponent j . Now, can it be reasonable, at an intuitive level, to take your own
belief as a focal point for what you believe that others believe? In my opinion, this can
be reasonable if there are no serious hints that some of your opponents really reason
differently than you do. This may happen if you have little or no information about
the opponents’ characteristics, and in particular about their ways of reasoning. In such
situations, one “easy” way to form a belief about what others believe is simply to
assume that your opponents have the same beliefs as you do. Moreover, if your own
belief satisfies certain properties, such as BOR, then by believing that others have the
same belief as you do, you will be sure to believe that others will share these properties
too. Hence, if you face a serious lack of information about your opponents’ beliefs,
then choosing your own belief as a “focal candidate” for the beliefs of others may
make intuitive sense. This lack of information about others will often occur in the type
of setting we consider, namely static games in which the game is only played once,
and players do not communicate with each other before reaching a decision.
6.2 Can SRB be weakened?
In Sect. 5 we have seen that none of the seven conditions in Theorem 4.5 can be
dropped completely. In particular, by completely dropping the condition that player i
has SRB, or believes that every opponent has SRB, one can no longer guarantee that
player i will choose a Nash strategy. However, can we replace the notion of SRB in
Theorem 4.5 by a weaker requirement without violating the content of the theorem?
The answer is “yes.” Consider, namely, the weaker condition stating that ti believes
that every opponent holds a correct belief about player i’s belief about his opponents’
choices. Let us call this condition weakly self-referential beliefs (WSRB). The dif-
ference with SRB is that the latter requires that ti believes that every opponent holds
a correct belief about player i’s complete belief hierarchy, not only about his belief
about the opponents’ choices. One can show the following result by basically copying
the proof from Theorem 4.5.
Theorem 6.1 Let M = (Ti , βi )i∈I be a finite epistemic model for a finite game . Let
ti ∈ Ti be a type that satisfies BOR, WSRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent
satisfies BOR, WSRB, PB and CIB. Then, every strategy that is rational for ti is a Nash
strategy for .
6.3 Single player’s perspective
Remember that our Theorem 4.5 only imposes conditions on the beliefs of a single
player, namely player i . These conditions guarantee that player i will choose a Nash
strategy. Moreover, as we have seen in Corollary 4.6, the same conditions imply that
player i’s belief about his opponents’ choices, together with his belief about the oppo-
nents’ belief about his own choice, constitute a Nash equilibrium. In this context, a
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Fig. 8 Beliefs of different players may not constitute a Nash equilibrium
Nash equilibrium is interpreted as a “personal object” that is completely inside player
i’s mind.
Now, suppose there are only two players in a game, player i and player j , who
both satisfy the conditions in Theorem 4.5. Do the players’ beliefs about the oppo-
nent’s choice then constitute a Nash equilibrium? The answer is “no.” Although the
conditions guarantee that player i’s personal beliefs about player j constitute a Nash
equilibrium (in the sense of Corollary 4.6) and that player j’s personal beliefs about
player i constitute a Nash equilibrium, it may well be that both players have differ-
ent Nash equilibria in their minds. Consequently, i’s belief about j’s choice and j’s
belief about i’s choice may not constitute a Nash equilibrium in beliefs. Consider,
for instance, the coordination game in Fig. 8. Construct an epistemic model M such
that T1 = {ta1 , tb1 }, T2 = {tc2 , td2 }, β1(ta1 ) assigns probability 1 to (c, tc2 ), β1(tb1 ) assigns
probability 1 to (d, td2 ), β2(t
c
2 ) assigns probability 1 to (a, t
a
1 ) and β2(t
d
2 ) assigns proba-
bility 1 to (b, tb1 ). Then, every type in T1 and T2 satisfies the conditions in Theorem 4.5,
however ta1 ’s belief about 2’s choice and t
d
2 ’s belief about 1’s choice do not constitute
a Nash equilibrium.
In this respect, our Theorem 4.5 differs crucially from Aumann and Brandenburger
(1995), Asheim (2006) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) who impose conditions
on the beliefs of all players which, together, imply that the players’ beliefs about the
opponents’ choices constitute a Nash equilibrium. In the following section, we will
explore the differences with these models in some more detail.
7 Comparison with other models
7.1 Aumann and Brandenburger’s model
Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) (AB from now on) make a distinction between
the case of two players and the case of more than two players, and provide sufficient
conditions for Nash equilibrium for both cases. In AB’s model, a type for player i does
not only specify i’s belief hierarchy, but also i’s strategy choice and i’s utility func-
tion. It is therefore possible to say that type ti is rational. AB’s theorem for two-player
games may be formulated as follows: Consider a pair (u1, u2) of utility functions,
a pair (µ1, µ2) ∈ (S1) × (S2) of probability distributions over strategy choices,
and a pair (t1, t2) of types. If at (t1, t2) it is true that (1) both players are rational and
believe that the opponent is rational, (2) both players i have utility function ui and
believe that opponent j has utility function u j , and (3) both players i have belief µ j
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about j’s strategy choice, and believe that j has belief µi about i’s strategy choice,
then (µ1, µ2) is a Nash equilibrium with respect to (u1, u2).
An important difference with our model is that AB simultaneously impose condi-
tions on the belief hierarchies of both players, whereas our model only imposes condi-
tions on the beliefs of a single player. So, in this sense AB’s model is more restrictive.
However, if we concentrate on the conditions that AB impose on the beliefs of a single
player, we see that these are weaker than our conditions in Theorem 4.5 for two-player
games. For instance, condition (1) above implies that player i BOR, but not necessarily
that i believes that j BOR, as we impose in Theorem 4.5. Also, condition (3) above
does not imply that i has SRB: i may have belief µ j about j’s choice, and at the same
time believe that j believes that i has a different belief about j’s choice. So, in fact,
condition (3) does not even imply that i has WSRB (see Theorem 6.1). Hence, when
analyzed from a single player’s perspective only, AB’s conditions are weaker than our
conditions for two-player games.
In order to highlight the differences with our model, consider again the game from
Fig. 8. In terms of AB’s model, let T1 = {ta1 , tˆ a1 } and T2 = {tc2 , tˆ c2 , td2 } be sets of types
where ta1 , tˆ
a




2 choose c, t
d
2 chooses d, t
a
1 believes that 2’s type is tˆ
c
2 ,








2 believes that 1’s type
is tˆ a1 and t
d
2 believes that 1’s type is t
a
1 . See Fig. 9 for an illustration. Here, the arrows
denote beliefs. For instance, the arrow from ta1 to tˆ
c
2 means that type t
a
1 believes that
player 2’s type is tˆ c2 . Furthermore, assume that each type has the utility function as
depicted in Fig. 8. Let µ1 be the probability distribution that assigns probability 1 to
a, and let µ2 be the probability distribution that assigns probability 1 to c. Then at
(ta1 , t
c
2 ) conditions (1), (2) and (3) above are satisfied. That is, at (ta1 , tc2 ) AB’s suffi-
cient conditions for Nash equilibrium are met. However, type ta1 does not believe that
player 2 BOR. Namely, ta1 believes that player 2 believes that player 1 is of type tˆ
a
1 and
chooses a. Type tˆ a1 , in turn, believes that player 2 chooses d, and hence a is not rational
for type tˆ a1 . So, t
a
1 believes that player 2 believes that player 1 chooses irrationally.
Also, ta1 does not have SRB: t
a
1 believes that player 2 chooses c, whereas t
a
1 believes
that player 2 believes that player 1 is of type tˆ a1 who believes that player 2 chooses d.
In fact, ta1 does not even have WSRB. Hence, type t
a
1 does not satisfy our sufficient
conditions for Nash strategy choice, although AB’s conditions are met at (ta1 , t
c
2 ).
The example above shows, in particular, that AB’s conditions do not imply com-
mon belief in rationality at (t1, t2). Here, by common belief in rationality, at (t1, t2)
we mean that both players are rational at (t1, t2), both players believe at (t1, t2) that
both players are rational, and so on. Polak (1995) proves that, if conditions (2) and (3)
Fig. 9 An example illustrating AB’s theorem
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above are strengthened by imposing common belief in the conjectures (µ1, µ2) and
the utility functions (u1, u2), then common belief in rationality will hold at (t1, t2).
Brandenburger and Dekel (1989) have shown a related result for two-player games: If
there is common belief in the conjectures (µ1, µ2) and the utility functions (u1, u2),
then (µ1, µ2) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if common belief in rationality holds.
For the case of more than two players, AB add the following two conditions: (4) at
the type profile (ti )i∈I the types’ belief hierarchies are derived from a common prior
probability distribution on the set of type profiles, and (5) at (ti )i∈I there is common
belief in the profile (βi )i∈I ∈ ×i∈I (S−i ) of beliefs about the opponents’ strate-
gies. By the latter we mean that ti ’s belief about the opponents’ choices is βi , that ti
believes that every opponent j has belief β j about the other players’ choices, that ti
believes that every opponent j believes that every other player k has belief βk about
the opponents’ choices, and so on. By adding these conditions (4) and (5), AB are able
to show that there is some profile (µi )i∈I ∈ ×i∈I (Si ) of probability distributions
over strategy choices such that for every player i , type ti ’s belief about the opponents’
choices is given by (µ j ) j =i , and that (µi )i∈I is a Nash equilibrium with respect to
(ui )i∈I . In particular, the conditions (4) and (5) imply that i’s belief about j’s choice
is stochastically independent from i’s belief about k’s choice, and that two different
players i and j have the same belief about k’s choice. These two properties are crucial
for their proof. In our model, these two properties follow from the assumption that ti
has SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent has SRB, PB and CIB (see Lemma
4.4). Hence, one could say that in our model the conditions of CIB and belief in PB
and CIB play a similar role as the conditions (4) and (5) in AB.
7.2 Asheim’s model
Asheim (2006, p. 5), provides a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium for the case
of two players. He basically uses the same epistemic model as we do, and his result
may be stated as follows: Consider a pair (t1, t2) of types, and assume that (1) t1 and t2
BOR, and (2) t1 believes that 2’s type is t2, and t2 believes that 1’s type is t1. Then, t1’s
belief about 2’s choice and t2’s belief about 1’s choice constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Similar to AB, Asheim simultaneously imposes conditions on the belief hierarchies
of both players. However, if we analyze Asheim’s conditions from a single-player per-
spective, then we see that Asheim’s conditions imply ours, Focus, namely, on a single
player, say player i . Conditions (1) and (2) above together imply that ti BOR, and
that ti believes that j BOR, since ti believes that j’s type is t j , who is supposed to
BOR. Moreover, conditions (1) and (2) imply that ti has SRB and believes that j has
SRB. Namely, ti believes that j’s type is t j , who believes that i’s type is ti . Hence,
ti believes that j believes that i’s type is ti , and hence ti has SRB. Also, by the same
reasoning, t j has SRB. Since ti believes that j’s type is t j , type ti believes that j has
SRB. Summarizing, we may conclude that Asheim’s conditions (1) and (2) imply that
ti BOR, believes that j BOR, has SRB, and believes that j has SRB. So, Asheim’s
conditions, when analyzed from a single-player’s perspective, imply our sufficient
conditions for Nash strategy choice.
Tan and Werlang (1988), in their Theorem 6.2.1, p. 382, provide conditions for Nash
equilibrium in two-player games that are similar to Asheim’s, although somewhat
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stronger. They assume, like Asheim, that t1 believes that 2’s type is t2, and that t2
believes that 1’s type is t1. However, Tan and Werlang impose common belief in ratio-
nality at (t1, t2), instead of only requiring that t1 and t2 BOR.
7.3 Brandenburger and Dekel’s model
Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) (BD from now on) use a model which substantially
differs from ours and the ones above. BD assume that there is a finite state space ,
that every player i holds a prior belief Pi ∈ (), that for every player i there is an
information partition Hi of , and that for every Hi ∈ Hi there is a conditional belief
Pi (·|Hi ) ∈ (Hi ) which is derived from Pi by Bayes’ rule whenever possible. A
strategy map for player i is an Hi -measurable map fi from  to Si . A profile ( fi )i∈I
of strategy maps is called an a posteriori equilibrium if for every player i , at every
Hi ∈ Hi the prescribed strategy is optimal given the conditional belief Pi (·|Hi ) and
the opponents’ strategy maps ( f j ) j =i . Hence, it is implicitly assumed that players
have correct beliefs about the opponents’ strategy maps, and that there is common
belief in this event. The prior beliefs (Pi )i∈I are called concordant if, for every choice
of the strategy maps, two different players i and j have the same prior belief about k’s
choice. The information partitions (H j ) j =i are called Pi -conditionally independent
if, for every choice of the strategy maps, i’s belief about j’choice is independent from
i’s belief about k’s choice. The information partitions (H j ) j =i are called Pi -infor-
mationally independent if, for every choice of the strategy maps, i’s belief about the
opponents’ choices does not depend on the information set Hi .
BD’s theorem on page 1401 can now be stated as follows: suppose that the prior
beliefs (Pi )i∈I and the information partitions (Hi )i∈I are such that (1) the prior beliefs
(Pi )i∈I are concordant, and for every i , the information partitions (H j ) j =i are (2) Pi -
conditionally independent and (3) Pi -informationally independent. Then, for every a
posteriori equilibrium there is a profile (µi )i∈I ∈ ×i∈I (Si ) of probability distri-
butions over strategy choices such that, for every i , player i’s prior belief about the
opponents’ choices is given by (µ j ) j =i , and (µi )i∈I is a Nash equilibrium.
In BD’s theorem, selecting an a posteriori equilibrium implies that player i BOR.
Concordance of the prior beliefs guarantees that i and j have the same beliefs about
k’s choice, and therefore implies our condition of PB. The assumption in BD that the
information partitions (H j ) j =i are Pi -informationally independent guarantees that
i’s belief about his opponents is independent of his information state, and therefore i
believes that his opponents are right about his own beliefs. (Recall the implicit assump-
tion that players have correct beliefs about the opponents’ strategy maps, and that there
is common belief in this event). The assumption of Pi -informational independence
therefore implies that player i has SRB. In BD, Pi -conditional independence guaran-
tees that i’s belief about j’s choice is independent from i’s belief about k’s choice.
Since Pj - and Pk-informational independence implies that i only deems one belief
hierarchy, and hence only one type, possible for opponents j and k, Pi -conditional
independence and Pj - and Pk-informational independence together imply that player
i has CIB. Summarizing, we see that BD’s conditions imply that player i BOR, and has
SRB, PB and CIB. Now, fix an opponent j . By BD’s conditions, player j also BOR,
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and has SRB, PB and CIB. Since BD’s condition of Pj -informational independence
implies that player i is correct about j’s belief hierarchy, it follows that i believes that
every opponent j BOR, and has SRB, PB and CIB. We may thus conclude that BD’s
conditions, when analyzed from a single-player’s perspective, imply ours.
Acknowledgements I wish to thank Geir Asheim and two referees for their helpful suggestions.
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